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"lathe would not, while the other party
remained in said business, "either directly or indirectly engage in the businets of printing and publishing in the
state of Michigan. This contract being
broken, the question was directly made
that it was void, because of its territorial extent; but CHMSTIANCY,J., in a
very discriminating and able judgment,
reviewed the authorities, ancient and
modern, and the contract was sustained,
and it was clearly shown, that there was
no inflexible rule of law, making all
contracts of this nature void merely because they covered the area of a whole
state, but that the restriction might properly be co-extensive in area with the
5usiness to which it applied.
We may, therefore, from this review
of the cases, properly conclude that the
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extent of a valid restriction depends
much upon the nature of the busintss
involved in the contract. If that be
local, limited in its extent, confined to
a narrow circle, the extent of prohibition should be limited; if the business
is far reaching, capable of being carried
on by the same party through a large
territory, like an express or carrier business, telegraph lines, publishing of books,
&c., the prohibition may be co-extensive
with the business. This flexible rule
will always carry out the object of the
rule itself, viz., protection to the promisee in his lawfl possible business, and
protection to the public against inconvenience or suffering for want of such trade
or business in their neighborhood or
vicinity.
EDMU~ND .1. BExxTur.

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Avpeal. of Kentucky.
COVINGTON STREET RAILWAY COMPANY v. COVINGTON AND
CINCINNATI STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.
A street railway has only a qualified right in its track superstructure.
The operation of street railways is a legitimate use of the highway, an exercise
of the public right of way over it.
The grant of a right to build and operate a street railway is subjict to a right in
the legislature to grant a part of said street railway, for an adequate compensation,
to another company for the use of said other company.
One legislature has not the power, by granting to an individual or corporation a
franchise in a public street, to bind succeeding legislatures, to deprive them of the
power and disable them to perform the duty of regulating and controlling the use
of the streets, in such manner as each legislature may judge the public welfare
demands.
The proprietary right a street railway company has in its track is subject to the
right of eminent domain.
UNDEIR authority conferred by its charter and a contract made
with the city council of Covington, the appellant had constructed
and was operating a line of street railways in Covington, when the
General Assembly incorporated the Covington and Cincinnati Street
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Railway Company, and authorized it to build and operate street
railways on such streets as the city council would permit, "and to
connect with and use the track of any other street railway company
in said city or vicinity, upon equitable terms"-that is, to pay such
company a fair compensation for the use of its track.
The appellee constructed a line leading from a remote part of the
city toward the Covington and Cincinnati bridge over the Ohio
river, until it came to the intersection of Short and Fourth streets,
where it connected its track with the appellants' track, and pursuing that street to Scott street, again left the appellants' track, and
built its own track to the south end of the approach to the bridge,
where it again connected with the appellants' track leading on to
the bridge. Having completed its road, the appellee commenced
running cars upon it, and over those portions of appellants' track
lying between Short street and Scott street, and between the south
end of the approach to the bridge and the Bridge Company's track
on the bridge, on which its cars enter the city of Cincinnati.
The appellant brought this suit to enjoin the use of its track by
the appellee. The chancellor dismissed the petition.
John G. Carlisle and Stevenson J6 O'Hara,for appellant.
Benton & Benton, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COFER, 0. J.-The question presented is one of more than usual
interest and importance. On one hand is the company by which a
street railway has been built, claiming protection for its private
right under its charter and the contract with the city; on the other
hand is the interest of the public, in the full and complete enjoyment of the use of the streets of the city, represented by the
appellee.
The streets of towns and cities belong primarily to the whole
public, every member of which has an interest in their use. The
right to control and regulate the use is vested in the legislature, to
be exercised at all times in the interest of the public, and every
legislative regulation should have for its object the security of the
public right to use and enjoy the streets for those purposes for
which they were established and are maintained, and every legislative act relating to the use of streets should be so construed, if
possible, as not only to secure the fullest enjoyment of their use,
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but so as to preserve intact, and without diminution by une legislature of the power of succeeding legislatures to control the use
of streets, in such manner as the public convenience may, in theii
Judgment, demand.
It is impossible to foretell what changes in the manner of using
streets may be occasioned by improvements in the modes of travel,
or what modifications in the use of the modes now employed may
be required by the increase of population and trade, or by the
shifting of the centres of business and the routes of travel from
one part of a city to another.
The necessities and convenience of the public may require to-day
but a single street railway, but circumstances may be so changed
in half a score of years as to require many lines. From their
nature, and the purpose for which they are used, street railways
must be confined to streets, or other public thoroughfares, where
the space that can be occupied by them is necessarily limited. It
may be impossible to meet the demands of the situation, unless new
routes, made necessary since the establishment of old ones, can be
extended o'er some portions of streets already occupied by old
ones, and it may be equally impossible, without unduly interfering
with other uses of the streets equally necessary to public convenience and comfort, to give such street railway company a separate track throughout the length of its entire line.
When such a state of case presents itself, one of three courses
must be pursued: 1, to permit new companies to run their cars
over the tracks of old companies, upon terms as may be equitable;
or, 2, to allow the older companies to occupy such new routes as
may extend over a part of the old routes; or, 8, to sacrifice the
public convenience and comfort, and the right to use any and all
streets and parts of streets in all the modes in which streets can be
appropriately and lawfully used, in the interest of private corporations created primarily for the public good.
The last of these alternatives ought not to be accepted, unless it
shall appear that there is no legal means of avoiding it. No act
of the legislature should be so construed as to lead to such a result
unless its terms are so plain as to leave no room for a different
conclusion, and when no other conclusion can be reached, it will
become a question whether one legislature has power, by granting
to an individual or corporation a franchise in a public street, to
bind succeeding legislatures, and to deprive them of the power and
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disable them to perform the duty, to regulate and control the ust
of streets in such a manner as each may judge that the public
welfare demands.
The second alternative is scarcely less objectionable. The old
companies would have the city completely at their mercy. Aware
that no new company could be authorized to use their tracks, they
would demand such terms as their cupidity might dictate, or they
might be unable or unwilling to undertake the new enterprise on
any terms, and the public would thus be made subject to the most
exorbitant exactions, and to depend for the necessary extension of
the railway system of the city upon the whims and caprices of
irresponsible corporations.
The first alternative is, therefore, the only one that is not
fraught with the most serious consequences to the public. This,
however, furnishes no sufficient reason for adopting that alternative rather than the others unless it can be done upon sound legal
principles. But that such consequences may follow affords a very
cogent reason for looking closely into the claim asserted by the
appellant that the legislature has no power to authorize the appellee to run its cars upon the appellant's track. Whether public
convenience demanded that the right should be given was a question to be decided by the legislature, and its decision upon that
point is conclusive on the courts.
We, therefore, proceed to the question in the case, had the
legislature the power it attempted to exercise ? The presumption
is that it had. The burden is on the appellant to prove that it had
not. This is attempted to be done by claiming that the appellant
has a right of property in its track which, like ordinary property,
is secured to it under the constitution.
That it has a qualified right of property in its track superstruc.
tare may be admitted, But it will not be denied that an individual
or corporation may place his or its property in such circumstances
that the public may use it without and even against consent.
The appellant holds title to its cars more absolute than its title
to its track, yet as long as they remain in its track and are driven
along the streets, the public have a right to enter and be transported in them to any point on its line, and to require that the car
shall be stopped to enable them to alight. This right in the public
arises from the circumstances in which the appellant has placed its
property. The right to carry passengers is expressly given, but
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the right of the public to be carried is merely implied from
the
right in the corporation to carry. It is nowhere expressed.
So
the right of the public to have the appellant's track used
for
transporting passengers in the carriages of other companies is
not
expressed. But may it not, like the right of individuals to
be
carried in the appellant's carriages, be implied from the circumstances in which it has placed its track, and the nature of
the
business in which the track is adapted to be used ?
The appellant has no interest in the soil under its track. The
operation of street railways is a legitimate use of the highway,
and an exercise of the public right of travel over it: ifinchman
v.
Horse Railroad Co., 2 0. E. Green 75; Jersey City, ft., _Railway
Co. v. Jersey City, ft., Railway Co., 5 Id. 60. A street railway
track is a part of the street. Individuals may drive ordinary
vehicles upon it at pleasure, provided they do not unreasonably
interfere with the passing of cars on the track. The track presents
only slight impediments to the ordinary use of the street, and does
not commonly require any change in the grade, and in states
in
which the construction of steam railroads through streets is
held
to be a new servitude for which abutters are entitled to compensation as for land taken for public use, it is almost uniformly held
that no such right exists because of the occupation of streets
by
street railways. The reason is, as we have before said, that
the
operation of street railways is a legitimate use of streets, and
an
exercise of the public right to travel upon them.
It is true no person can lawfully place upon a street railway
track a carriage adapted to run only on the iron rails and use it
for
transporting passengers along the line, unless expressly authorized
to do so. When the legislature grants to one person the right
to
construct a railway in a public street, and to carry passengers
for
hire, the grant is necessarily exclusive so long as similar authority
is not granted to another. No person would expend money
to
o)nstruct a railway if all others, or any other, might at pleasure
put cars upon and use it to carry passengers for hire without
making compensation for the use of the track. But although such
exclusive privilege be granted, why should it continue to be exclusive ? The only reason that can be given is that the grantee
has
expended money or assumed obligations on the faith of the grant.
But did it not do so with the knowledge, implied at least, that
it
held its right subordinate to the power and duty of the legislature
VOL. X X-V-II-97
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to regulate and control the use of the streets in such manner as
the public interest might, in its judgment, from time to time
demand?
There was no attempt by express words in the appellant's
charter to give it the exclusive right to run cars upon the streets
occupied by its track, or even upon the track itself, and we have
decided that no such exclusive right exists as to the streets. As
to the track placed in the street, and thereby made a part of the
public highway, and which the exigencies of the public interest
might demand for the use of other companies, we think the right
to its exclusive use was received and held, subject to the power of
the legislature, to permit it to be used by such other persons or
corporations as it might direct, whenever in the judgment of the
legislature a due regard to the public right to use the streets,
renders it necessary to do so.
This conclusion is in accord with the views of Judge REDFIELD,
as expressed in his report to the Massachusetts Legislature upon
the nature and extent of street railway franchises: 1 Redfield on
the Law of Railroads, vol. 1, p. 315, 322, and is supported by the
opinions of the Supreme Court of New York, in Railroad Co. v.
Kerr, 45 Barb. 138; and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Smith v. Boston and Maine Railroad Co., 6 Allen
262, and in our opinion may be sustained upon another ground
equally, if not more satisfactory.
Whatever proprietory right a street railway company may have
in its track, such right cannot be more sacred than the right of
natural persons to property owned by them, and is equally subject
to the power of eminent domain.
Discussing this subject, Judge COOLEY says: "Franchises, like
every other thing of value, and in the nature of property within
the state, are subject to this power (of eminent domain), and it is
believed thaz an express agreement in the charter, that the power
of eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair or
affect the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement beyond
the power of the legislature to make, must be considered as only a
valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant, and as such
liable to be appropriated under the power of eminent domain :"
Const. Lim. 281, top p., 4th ed., 343.
And after saying that when the existence of a particular power
in the government is recognised on the ground of necessity, it cannot
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be surrendered or bargained away by the department which holds
it in trust, and that if this might be done the authority to make laws
for the government of the state might be so exercised in strict
conformity to the constitution, as at length to destroy the state by
disabling it to perform its ordinary and essential functions, the
same author proceeds to say: "It must follow that any legislative
bargain in restraint of the complete, continuous and repeated
exercise of the right of eminent domain is unwarranted and void:"
Id. 525, top p. 652.
The power of eminent domain is founded in necessity, and is
given to enable the government to provide for necessary public
buildings, works and improvements. And of the necessity for its
exercise the legislature is the sole and exclusive judge, provided
the use in aid of which the power is exerted be a public use. The
carrying of passengers for hire is a prerogative of sovereignty.
The use of a street by an incorporated railway company for carrying passengers between different points in a bity is public use.
The legislature authorized the appellee to connect 'ith and use
the track of the appellant upon equitable terms, that is, by paying
to the appellant a fair compensation for the use of its track.
If we treat the track as the private property of the appellant,
and as in a situation to be protected by the guaranty of the right
to private property contained in the constitution, the legislature
had no power thus to authorize it to be used, except in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. We must therefore hold, in this
aspect of the case, that in giving the appellee the right to connect
with and use the appellant's track, the legislature intended to
exercise the power of eminent domain, and as it has provided for
compensation, the act was a valid exercise of that power.
That the act did not provide for the appropriation of the whole
•roperty in the track is not a valid objection to it. It provides
.or taking such part of the use as the legislature deemed necessary
for the public use, and left the residue in the appellant.
To have done more would have been unjust, and of doubtful
constitutionality. If the appellant's line continued to be necessary
to the convenience and comfort of a portion of the public, it was
due to that portion that only so much of the right to the use of
appellant's track should be taken as was necessary to the convenience of another portion.
It was eminently just and proper to provide for the wants of
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each portion, and that the interference with the appellant's property should not go beyond the necessity on which the right to
interfere at all is based.
The appellee's charter does not provide a mode for ascertaining
the "fair compensation" to which the' appellant is entitled, nor
how nor when it shall be paid.
In view of this defect in the charter, if the appellee's right
could only be sustained under the power of eminent domain, and
it was seeking the aid of the chancellor to be let into possession,
we should doubt whether he ought to extend such aid until the
amount of compensation due should be ascertained and paid, or
secured. But the appellee is already in possession, and the chancellor is applied to for an injunction to enjoin it from continuing
to use appellant's track. It is not claimed that the appellee has
refused to pay or is unable to pay. In such a case the chancellor,
who must always exercise a sound discretion in acting upon an
application for an injunction, might properly refuse it.
If the parties cannot agree upon the amount and time of payment
of the compensation due to the appellant, the chancellor, with the
aid of the master, has ample power to do so.
The city is made an appellee by an amended statement of
parties, but we do not perceive that the appellant can, under any
circumstances, be entitled to any relief against the city on account
of the matters involved in this litigation.
Judgment affirmed.
The leading case upon this subject is
that referred to in the decision-Sixth
Av. Railway Co. v. Kerr, 45 Barb. 138,
which held, "where a railroad is laid in
a public street, under a permissive grant
to the company to use a portion of the
street for that purpose, the company
does not acquire the same unqualified
title and right of disposition to the land
occupied which individuals have to their
lands. The only exclusive power conveyed by said grants is that of using
railway carriages in the same manner as
the grant of a stage line confers for the
time being-the grant of a monopoly of
using such stages for the transportation
of passengers for hire on that route."
After a railway company has obtained

permission trom the Common Council of
New York to lay a railway through certain streets in New York, and such grant
is subsequently confirmed by an act of
the legislature, the legislature has the
power to grant similar privileges to
another company, and to authorize the
latter to run upon, intersect or use any
portion of the tracks already laid, on
condition of making compensation or
payment to the first grantees, if the parties do not agree. Such a grant is not a
violation of any right of property. The
grantees must be considered as holding
the grants for public use, in the public
street, which is open to all the public.
The right to grant a crossing of the
road necessarily involves a right to pass
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over a larger portion of the road, when
the legislature so directs.
A railway corporation, by acquiring
the right to construct its road across a
highway and obtaining title to the land
for its road-bed, does not destroy or impair the public easement. The perfect
and unqualified right of every citizen to
pass over the road at that point remains
the same as before.
Judge REDFIELD says, I Redfield on
Railways, pt. 3, 76, p. * 318: "A legislature may nei ertheless allow other persons, either natural or corporate, to do
a similar business in the same streets,
or to do it upon the tracks of an existing company, by making compensation
to another company, whenever, in their
judgment, the public good requires it.
In tile one case, the grant being wholly
independent, is understood to be made
because the amount of travel is supposed
to require two such modes of conveyance;
and in the other, the compensation is regarded as equivalent to the use."
Thus, both by principle and authority
the decision in the principal case is supported, in relation to the right reserved
in the legislature to control and direct
the use of streets.
The other point, of subjecting a railway itself to tile power of eminent domain, is of no little interest. Quoere, if
the right of eminent domain exists as to
one part of the railway track, does it not
to all ? Under the principal decision, it
certainly seems so; but then the compensation awarded would be equal in
amount to the profits of the road, subjected to this right of eminent domain.
While this is the reach of this decision,
it is presumed that it is hedged and protected by the principle that it will not be
exercised only where the necessity and
convenience of the public require; so
conditioned, it is perfectly safe.
The franchise for a turnpike or bridge,
or other similar corporation, may be
taken for a free road or for a railway:
Arm 'ngton v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745 ; West
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River Bridge, Dx, 6 How. U. S. 507 ;
Central Bridge Car. v. Lowell, 4 Gray
474; Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 73
Penn. St. 29. But compensation, either
for the entire franchise or for the special
injury, must be made: Crosby v. lanover, 36 N. H. 404. The franchise of
one railway may be taken for the construction of another railway: Ric/hnind
Railway Co. v. Louisa Railway Co., 13
How. 81, 82 ; Newcastle aid R. Railway Co. v. P. and Id. Railway -b., 3
Ind. 464. It is well settled that the
grant of any privilege or franchise carries no implied exclusion of similar privileges and franchises being conferred
upon other persons, natural or corporate: Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren, II Peters 420 ; Thorpe v. Rut. and
Bur. Railway Co., 27 Vt. 140; Boston
and Lowell Railway Co. v. Salem and
Lowdl Railway Co., 2 Gray 1 ; Mohawk
Bridge Co. v. Utica, 6'c., Railway Co., 6
Paige 554; Eudson, 4-c., Canal Co. v.
New York, 6'c., Railway Co., 9 Id. 323.
The legislature may in all cases determine when and where the public necessities require additional facilities of a
similar or analogous character, where
the former grant is not exclusive : .IleRee v. Uldmington and Raleigh Railway
Co., 2 Jones Law 186. This case seems
to cover the principal case, which decided that the grant to the appellant war
not an exclusive grant.
The exclusive character of a corporate
grant will not preclude the power to take
the franchise under the right of eminent
domain. The stipulation in the charter
that the grant shall be exclusive of all
others, being subject to the same law as
other property, whether in possession or
inaction; all which is confessedly subject to the exercise of the right of eminent domain: Enfidd Toll Bridge Co. v.
Harford and New Haven Railway Cc.,
17 Conn. 40, 454; .Matter of Kerr, 42
Barb. 119. In regard to the right-of
eminent domain, it now seems to be conceded that no legislature, upon any con-
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sideration or pretence whatever, can

sive, it was subject to the power existing

deprive a future legislature of its exercise in the absolute annihilation of corporate franchises, upon a just and adequate
compensation: Bac-us v. Lebanon, 11 N.

in succeeding legislatures to exercise the
power of eminent domain.
Thus this most interesting decision is
sustained by a great weight of authority,
and what appears to be at first blash
unjust, on closer investigation is found
to be based on cogent reasons of public.
policy and upon sound law.
A. G. SIRALL.
Cincinnati, 0.

H. 19.
Under the above decisions, and bearing in mind that public necessity must
demand it, and adequate compensation
must be made, the law is, that even if
the gran to appellant had been excin-
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Shares of stock in a foreign corporation, owned by a resident of Ohio, are taxable
n that state, notwithstanding the capital of the corporation is taxed in the state
where the corporation is located.
The provisions of the Act of May IIth 1878, subjecting such shares of stock so
owned to taxation in this state, are not in conflict with the constitution.
Taxation is not double in a legal sense, unless the double tax is levied upon the
same property within the same jurisdiction.
The capital of a corporation, no matter what it may be invested in, and the individual shares of stock are different properties, of distinct species.
The situs of shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, is the domicile of the owner.

THIS action was brought to enjoin the auditor of the county of
Cuyahoga from placing upon the duplicate for taxation, in pursuance of a direction from the Board of Equalization of the city
of Cleveland, investments in the capital stock of corporations
created in other states, owned by the plaintiffs, residents of this
state.
The corporations were railroad, mining, manufacturing and
express companies, and each derived its franchises wholly fiom the
state where it was located.
The petition avers that their capital stock is all invested in real
estate and other fixed property, situated in other states, where the
same is annually listed and taxed, and where their entire business
is transacted, and that no part of either is within this state, or
subject to its jurisdiction.
The defendant demurred to the petition for want of sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action.
On appeal to the District Court, a preliminary injunction was
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granted, and on plaintiffs' motion the cause was reserved for
decision by this court.
R. P. Ranney, for plaintiffs.
MIarvin, Laird & (adwell, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BOYNTON, J.-The sole question arising upon the demurrer to
the petition, is whether the shares of stock in corporations created
in other states, which shares are owned by persons residing here,
are taxable under our constitution and laws, where the capital stock
of the corporation is invested in real and fixed property situated in
the state in which the corporation exists, and where by the laws of
such state the same is required to be listed for taxation.
The claim of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is, that the
right, in such case, to levy and collect a tax upon the shares of
stock of such owner, finds no warrant either in the constitution or
the statute.
The constitutional power to tax shares of stock in foreign companies, owned by residents of Ohio, was directly involved in Worthington et ux. v. Sebastian, 25 Ohio St. 1. in which case it was
held, that the duty imposed by the statute to tax such shares was
neither in violation of the constitution of the state, nor of the
United States.
The question arose under the Act of 1859 (2 S. & C. 1438);
but the provisions of that act, in respect to property made subject
to taxation, were substantially the same as those of the Act of
1878, under which the right is asserted to tax the shares of the
plaintiffs in foreign companies.
It therefore follows that if that case was correctly determined,
it is decisive of the present. We have carefully examined the
grounds on which it rests, and are entirely satisfied with the conclusion there reached.
No provision of the constitution is more explicit in its terms
than that relating to the subject of taxation. With few exceptions
in which, from considerations of public policy, a discretion is left
to the legislature to impose a tax or not, the constitution imperatively enjoins the passage of laws taxing by a uniform rule "all
moneys, credits, investments in stocks, joint-stock companies, or
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otherwise; and also all real and personal property, according to its
true value in money :" Art. 12, sect. 2.
In pursuance of this requirement, it was provided by the Act
of 1878, that "all property, whether real or personal, in this state,
and whether belonging to individuals or corporations; and all
moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, or otherwise, of
persons residing in this state, shall be subject to taxation, except
only such as may be expressly exempted therefrom."
Thus, both. the constitution and the statute expressly name
"investments in stocks" as one of the subjects of taxation, without any restriction or limitation as to the place or state where such
"stocks" may be authorized or issued. And that the meaning of
the term should admit of no doubt, it was declared "to include all
moneys invested in the capital or stock of any association, c6rporation, joint-stock company, or other company, the capital or stock
.of which is or may be divided into shares, which are transferable
by each owner, without the consent of the other partners or stockholders, for the taxation of which no special provision is made by
law, held by persons residing in this-state, either for themselves or
others."
It was moreover provided by the 1st section of said act, defining
the property subject to taxation, that the term "personal property" should, inter alia, be held "to mean and include, every
share, portion or interest in the capital stock of a corporation ;"
and by section 13 of the act relating to the listing of property, it
was further declared, that "property of every description, moneys
and credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or
otherwise, shall be listed in the name of the person who was the
owner thereof on the day preceding the second Monday of April,
in each year; but no person shall be required to list for taxation
any share or shares of the capital stock of any company, the
capital stock of which is taxed in the name of such company."
In view of thege provisions, it is perfectly obvious that shares
of stock in corporations wherever located, owned by our citizens,
are subject to taxation, except in cases falling within the operation
of the proviso of section 13, and provided that the statute is open
to no constitutional objection. The proviso to the 18th section,
exempting from taxatior any share or shares of stock in any company, the capital stock of which is taxed in the name of the
company, is a substitute for the same provision found in the first

BRADLEY v. BAUDER.

clause of section 59 of the Act of 1859. It had in that act, and
has in the Act of 1878, no reference to shares of stock in foreign
companies. It is only where the capital stock of the company is
required to be taxed in Ohio, that the right to such exemption
obtains. The capital of the corporation is the property of the
corporation, and it can only be taxed in the state where the property is located. The right of taxation is limited to persons,
property and business within the jurisdiction of the state where
the right is attempted to be exercised: Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300. Investments in stocks in foreign companies
owned by residents here, if property within the state, are not only
made subject to taxation by the constitution, but, as we have seen,
their taxation is expressly required by the statute.
It is, however, contended, that because the capital of the company is invested in real and fixed property in the state where the
corporation is located, and in which state taxes upon the same are
regularly levied and paid, a tax here upon the shares of stock of
those residing here, is a tax upon the same property, and therefore
results in double taxation.
The argument is: that the capital of the corporation is invested
in property which is taxed in the name of the corporation, and
that the shares in the capital stock, when owned by individuals,
only represent proportions in the ownership of such property, and
hence, to tax the shares is another mode of taxing the property of
the corporation and that a tax upon both, although the tax upon
one is imposed by another state, violates the rule or principle of
equality established by the constitution. This argument, however plausible it seems, has never met with favor from the courts.
Double taxation, in a legal sense, does not exist, unless the double
tax is levied upon the same property within the same jurisdiction.
Here the property owned by the plaintiffs, is not only not the same
as that owned by the corporation, but its situs, so far as shares of
stock are capable of one, is in a different state.
The capital of a corporation, whatever invested in, and the
individual shares of stock, are distinct species of property : Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679. The owner of a share of
stock owns no part of the capital of the company: Watson v.
SPratley, 10 Exch. 236. The corporation is its sole owner, holding the same, it is true, in trust for the purposes for which the
corporation was created, and upon its winding up, for the benefit
VOL. XXVIII.-98
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of creditors and shareholders. The ownership of a share of btock
is but the ownership of the right to participate, from time to time.
in the net profits of the business, and upon the dissolution of ihe
corporation to a portion of the assets after the payment of the corporate debts. It is personal property, which, upon the death of the
owner, goes to his administrator, and not his heirs, although the
entire capital of the corporation may consist of real estate. He
may sell or dispose of it at pleasure, and in so doing works no
change or modification in the title to the corporate property. And
when not otherwise provided by statute, its situs for purposes of
taxation follows and adheres to the domicile of its owner. This
proposition is supported by a great weight of authority: The State
v. Branin, 3 Zab. 484; Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 30 N. J.
(Law) 13; Barrington v. County Commissioners, 16 Pick. 572;
Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen 268; Whitesell v. County
of Northampton,49 Penn. St. 526; Cooley on Taxation 16; Burr.
on Taxation 188.
The same principle governs a chose in action; for purposes of
taxation, its situs is that of the domicile of the owner, although
the debt is secured by a mortgage upon realty in another state, and
by agreement of the parties expressly made subject to its laws:
Kirtland v. R7otehkiss, 42 Conn. 426.
In our opinion the constitutional power to tax shares of stock,
owned by our citizens in corporations located without the state, does
not depend on whether the capital of the corporation is or is not
taxed in the state where the corporation is created.
The power is the same, whether the capital of the corporation is
there taxed or not; otherwise the power of taxation conferred by
the constitution, would be made to depend upon the operation of
laws of a foreign jurisdiction-a proposition so obviously ill founded
that the moment it is stated its falsity becomes apparent.
In Dwight v. Mayor, 12 Allen 316, the plaintiff, the owner of
shares in a foreign railroad corporation, sought a deduction from
the tax upon his stock, by reason of the tax on the property of
the corporation in the state where the same was located. The right
to such deduction was denied, the court remarking that "1shares in
a foreign railroad corporation held by citizens of this state, are
fully taxed here, and no deduction is made for any taxation to
which the corporations are subject, in the states where they are
located. So it is in regard to shares held by our citizens in banks,
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insurance companies, and other moneyed corporations, situated in
other states. Such shares when held by our citizens are here
treated as so much personal estate, following the person of the
owner, and taxable at their full value in this Commonwealth,
regardless of what may be the foreign law as to taxation of the
capital or any part of it elsewhere."
This case is but one of a great number that hold the same
doctrine.
The demurrer is sustained, the injunction vacated and petition
dismissed
This decision will finally set at rest, in
Ohio, the right of the legislature to enact
a law, taxing shares of stocks owned by
residents of Ohio, in what are called
foreign corporations.
The constitution and laws of Ohio had
been considered of so unfriendly a character to stockholders (on account of imposing a personal liability equal to the
amount of stock held in Ohio companies),
that for years Ohio capitalists have
sought for investment in corporations
outside of the state, supposing that by
so doing they were not only escaping
personal liability, but also that the shares
of stock which they were thus investing
in, would he free from taxation in Ohio,
inasmuh as the corporations paid taxes
upon thoir personal property and real
estate in the states where they were created. The wording of the constitution
of that state, art. 12, sect. 2, which
reads: "Laws shall be passed, taxing,
by a uniform rule, all moneys, credits,
investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock
companies, or otherwise; and also all
real and personal property, according to
its true value in money"-would seem
to have been reasonably clear, and to
have demanded of the legislature the
passage of laws taxing these stocks.
Acting under this direction, the legislature has, since the adoption of the Constitution of 1852, enacted laws substantially like the one under which this cause
arose. Yet it was thought by many able
lawyers that it was neither the intention

of these acts nor of the constitution to
compel a return of these stocks for taxation, for the reasons o ably expressed
by Judge RANEar, in his brief, supporting his petition in this case, namely:
" 1. No word in the constitution or
laws expressly defines such interests as
the subjects of taxation. If they are
covered at all, it is only by general language, which it is completely settled
must be restrained by construction to
persons and things within the territorial
limits of the state: Steamboat Ohio v.
Stunt, 10 Ohio St. 582; Booth v. Hubbard, 8 Id. 243; Stetson v. Bank, 2 Id.
174; Woodard v. Railroad Co., 10 Id.
122; Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 509; Farnum v. Blackstone, 1 Sumu. 46.
"2. The basis of taxation in this state
is property alone, and property within the
jurisdiction of the state.
"The residence of the owner is wholly
immaterial: Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3
Ohio St. 1 ; City of Zanesville v. Rickards, 5 Id. 589; Carrier v. Gordon, 21
Id. 605 ; People ex rel. Hoyt v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224.
"3. To tax property situated in other
states, and there rightfully subjected to
taxation, is double taxation, and subjects
the same owner to a burden of taxation
twice as large as that imposed upon property differently situated, and is a positive violation of the principle of equality
ordained by the constitution: Sane authorities.
"4. The statute itself defines 'invest
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ments' in the stock of corporations as
personal property (not debts or choses in
action), from whieh no deductions can
be made. Its actual situs-the place
where the investment is made and remains-is the place of its rightful taxation, and if beyond our territorial limits,
it cannot be legally taxed here.
"5." It stands admitted by the pleadings that all the assets and property of
these corporations consists of real estate
and fixed property in the states incorporating them, and that the entire capital
of each is invested therein; that upon all
this property (and in one of the states the
entire market value of the stock and franchises in addition), taxes are regularly
levied and paid where it is situated.
Under such circumstances there is no
' value in money' to the shares of stock
outside of the property in which they are
invested. That property being taxed
$in the name of the company'-the
trustee of the shareholders-the ' shares
of the capital stock' in the hands of
shareholders are expressly exempted from
further taxation by the 13th section of
the Act of 1878 : 56 0. L. 175.
"6. Any other construction of the
law would make it plainly unconstitutional. Aside from the few exemptions
to be made at the discretion of the legislature, what may be taxed, musT be
taxed, and taxedequally according to its
money value. i obedience to the constitution, the property of domestic corporations is taxed 'the same as the property of individuals,' and the stockholders, on account of their investments
in it, are not taxed. In other words,
the property held by domestic corporations, and not investments in it, is alone
taxed, and so much of it as consists of
fixed property outside the state, and
taxed there, is not taxed here, and cannot be.
"To treat residents of the state, owning the same investments in property
held by foreign corporations differently,
isto discriminate against them, and to

produce that inequality of burden condemned by the constitution. It is taxation upon the person, on account of
his residence, and not upon property,
within the power of the state to tax, or
to protect from taxation in the state
where it is situated: Bridge C. v.
Maryer, 31 Ohio St. 328.
"7. A corporation is a purely local
institution. It must dwell in the state
that creates it, and can have no existence
in other states. Its franchises are pure
creations of the state, and inseparably
blended with the property it acquires;
they together constitute the money value
of all it has, as well as that of the natural
persons who compose and own it. Shares
in its capital stock, when sold to and
held by individuals, are but shares and
proportions in the ownership of these
elements of value, and the certificates
of such ownership are but the title-deeds
of the interest owned, and no more transfer the property from its situs in one
state to that of another than the possession of a patent or deed, by a resident
of Ohio, for lands in Michigan, would
subject the value of the lands to taxation
here: Story Conft. Laws, sect. 383 ; 0.
4 H. _Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, I BI.
286 : Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.
512; Tappan'v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
19 Wall. 499 ; B. 4. O. Railroad Co. v.
Cary, 28 Ohio St. 211.
"But whatever may be thought of the
proper construction of our laws, to my
mind it is clear beyond a shadow of a
doubt that the state has no taxing power
over the property described in the petition and undertaken to be returned for
taxation.
"It is now completely settled that
'the power of taxation of a state is
limited to persons, property and business within her jurisdiction,' and that
' all taxation must relate to one of these
subjects:' RailroadCo. v. Pennsylvania,
15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Bank, 19 Id.
499.
"The first and the last of these sub-
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feds may be laid out of the present case ; are not property,
and therefore are not

the first because such taxation is absolutely prohibited in this state, and the
last because it is conceded that no business is done in the state.
"And thus the whole matter is reduced to the single question whether
investments in real and fixed property in
another state, held by a corporation
there, and constituting its capital stock,
and there paying full taxes according to
its value, are again subject to taxation
inthis
state ?
"If such property were held by the
natural persons who compose the corporation, either by legal or equitable title,
no one would pretend that it could be,
although the owners continued to reside
in this state.
"No single reason upon which taxation has been supposed to be founded,
would justify such an imposition. It
would receive no protection from our
laws, and would owe nothing for any
protection.
"And yet, while the property remains
exactly the same in nature and kind,
and the respective interests of the proprietors in it the same, because the state
in which it is situated, the better to enable the proprietors to use and improve
it, sees fit to confer upon them corporate
unity and perpetual succession, and
thereby more completely localizing both
property and proprietors, and justly entitling itself to impose taxes upon it all
for the franchises conferred and protecti~mnafforded : it is claimed that this
very process brings it all, and its whole
value, into Ohio for the purpose of imposing another tax upon it here.
"When gross absurdity, instead of the
perfection of human reason,' comes to
o the foundation of jurisprudence, such
a proposition may be maintained, and
never before: Mechanics' Bank v. Railroad Co., 13 N. Y. 627 ; Railroad Co. v.
&Auyler et al., 17 Id. 595 ; Maltby v.
Railroad Gb., 52 Penn. St. 140.
The premise being that these shares

taxable, the question fairly arises, what
is property?
A promissory note, in one sense, is a
mere representative of money or of other
value. Money itself is the mere reprt
sentative of value ; because they have &
representative character, are they the lebt
property ? The term property is the
mere expression of a right, which one
has to or in things-" the term things
being the technical word expressive of
every object, except man, which may
become the active subject of right.
Things are divided into corporeal and
incorporeal. Incorporeal things are not
the object of sensation, but are creatures
of the mind, being rights issuing out of a
thing or things corporeal, or concerning or exercisable within the same, as an
obligation, a hypothecation, a servitude,
and in general that which consists only
in a certain right:" Bony. L. Diet. and
authorities cited.
Under this definition, a share or certificate of stock is well included. It is an
incorporeal thing, the subject of owner
ship; that ownership is absolute. It
may be transferred, and with the transfer, all rights of the former owner terminate. It maybe pledged as a collateral;
may be devised by will, and all those
rights which cluster around any incorporeal thing, go with and appertain to it.
If this is true, then these shares are property, growing out of a "corporeal
thing" or corporation ; therefore incorporeal. Being property, they are the
subjects of ownership, but that ownership follows the situs of the owner, because they are "incorporeal."
A few examples will more fully illustrate.
A bond, issued by a city, town or
railroad company, belongs to this class
of property, and can only be taxed
where its owner resides.
A promissory note ; a bill of exchange;
a mortgaged security (unless, by the laws
of the state, the mortgage is treated as a
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conveyance of so much of the real estate,
and a deduction is made in the value
of the property accordingly) : all stand
upon the same basis. And the premise
that nothing is the subject of taxation in
Ohio but property, does not lead to the
conclusion that stocks may not be taxed,
but the contrary. Other states are holding in the same manner, and we have no
doubt the rule will be settled everywhere,
that stocks and shares of stocks in such

corporations are taxable where their
owners reside.
The authorities are numerous, but it
is not necessary to refer to them here, as
the leading ones are referred to in the
decision; but we would call attention to
a very able article upon this subject, contained in the Am. Law Reg. (N. S.),
vol. 18, page 1.
A. J. MARtvix.
Cleveland, 0.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
PROVIDENCE CHRISTIAN UNION v. GEORGE C. ELIOTT.
A. conveyed to B. certain realty by a deed poll in which specified rents were
reserved for periods of time described. B. entered under the deed. Held, that by
his entry B. contracted to pay the rents as reserved.
B.'s contract being an implication of law was not within the Statute of Frauds.
A. could maintain assnmpsit against B. for the rent due and unpaid.
By his entry B. adopted the conditions of A.'s deed, and could not terminate his
holding by vacating the premises without the consent of A.

EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas.

B. N. and S. S. Lapham, for plaintiff.
MTlingkast and Ey, for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
DuBFEE, C. J.-This action is as8umpeit to recover the rent for
two quarters of certain premises demised by the plaintiff to the

defendant for a term of ten years by deed under seal, wherein
reitt Was reserved, payable quarterly, at the rate of $500 per
annum for the first two years, $600 for the next three, and $1000

for the remaining five years. The lease was drawn in the form
of an indenture, and, having been executed by the plaintiff, as
lessor, was delivered to the defendant as lessee, who, without
having executed it or any counterpart, entered on the demised
premises under it and paid the rent reserved for five years. The
defendant then vacated the premises, claiming that his term under

the lease, which was lost or not producible, had expired, and
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sent the keys to the plaintiff, who however declined to receive
tnem. The case came on for trial in the Court of Common Pleas,
and the defendant, among other defences, set up the Statute of
I rauds, contending that the action was not maintainable because
the contract for rent had never been signed by him and was not to
be performed within a year, and because, having vacated the premises and tendered the keys, no action would lie for use and occupation. He, requested the court to instruct the jury accordingly.
The court refused to do so, but did instruct the jury that if the
defendant entered into possession under the lease and paid the rent
reserved in it, he would be bound by it and could be charged in
this action. The defendant excepted. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff, whereon a judgment was rendered in his favor.
The question is whether the court below committed any error in
refusing to charge or in charging as stated.
We do not think any error was committed. The contract to
pa v the rent reserved was not an express contract on the part of
th defendant, but an implied contract, or a contract raised by law
from the nature of the transaction, and it has been repeated]y heltl
that such contracts are not within the Statute of Frauds : Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510; Pleteher v. Ille-_arlane, 12 Id. 43;
Pelch v. Taylor, 13 Pick. 133; Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133;
Kabley v. Worcester Gas Light Co., 102 Mass. 392; Sage v.
Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; Allen v. Pryor, 3 A. K. Marsh. 305;
Browne on Statute of Frauds, sect. 166. In Goodwin v. Gilbert,
the doctrine is broadly laid down, that, where land is conveyed by
deed poll and the grantee enters under the deed, certain duties
being reserved to be performed, as no action lies against the
grantee on the deed, the grantor may maintain assumpsit for the
non-performance of the duties reserved, and the promise being
raised by the law is not within the Statute of Frauds. In Pike v.
Brown, Chief Justice SHAW, in delivering the opinion of the
court, instances the case of rent reserved in a lease by deed poll as
a signal and familiar illustration of the doctrine. And that occu.
pation under the lease is not indispensable to the recovery, if only
the lease has been accepted, was distinctly decided in Kabley v.
Worcester Gas Light Co., in a case in which the lessees never
occupied at all. "It is enough," say the court, "that they accepted the conveyance which gave them the right of immediate and
exclusive occupation. The law would imply from such acceptance
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a promise to comply with the terms of the lease, and such a pro
mise is not within the Statute of Frauds." The reason is, the
estate, vests the moment the lease is accepted, and the lessee in
taking the estate takes it cum onere, and accordingly must pay the
rent so long at least as he holds it. We are not aware that these
decisions have ever been either questioned or controverted, except
by a dissenting opinion in Allen v. Pryor. We decide, therefore,
that the exceptions must be overruled, and the judgment of the
court below affirmed with costs of this court.
Exceptions overruled.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
THEODORE S. DEVEAU v.PHILO P. SKIDMORE.
A writ in an action at Jaw for damages is fatally defective if it contains no ad

damnum clause.
And it does not suffice that the declaration shows that the plaintiff has sustained
damage, and furnishes the data for ascertaining the damage.
Such a case stricken from the docket as not showing any jurisdiction in the courm.

COVENANT broken, with counts for money paid, &c., brought to
the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield county. The writ contained no ad damnum clause, and the court, upon motion of the
defendant, ordered the case erased from the docket. The plaintiff
filed a motion in error.
G. Stoddard, for the plaintiff.
R. .E.DeForest,for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARDEE, J.-The pleader sets forth in his declaration that the
defendant conveyed a piece of land to the plaintiff by a deed, in
which he covenanted that the same was free from encumbrance,
when, in fact, there were then upon it tax liens to remove which
the plaintiff paid $277. Counts were added for $300, money had
and received, money lent and advanced, &c.; but he omitted to
insert the ad damnum clause. The writ was duly served, returned
and entered upon the docket of the Court of Common Pleas, from
which it was erased for want of jurisdiction apparent upon the
record. The plaintiff filed a motion in error.

